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T HE Supreme Court's decision in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB' provides a
unique and telling example of the role of foreign labor law in shaping our
own labor law. The central significance of that decision to the structure of our
labor law and collective bargaining makes our starting there doubly relevant.
The J.I. Case Company had, for a number of years, made uniform written one-
year contracts of employment with individual employees each August 1st.
These contracts were not the product of any unfair labor practice, nor were
they made for the purpose of forestalling unionization or collective bargaining.
The United Auto Workers won a representation election and was certified by
the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining representative
of the production and maintenance union, but the company refused to deal
with the union in any manner affecting rights and obligations under the exist-
ing individual contracts until they expired. The N.L.R.B. found that this
amounted to a refusal to bargain collectively in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act. When this case came before the Supreme Court, the narrow
issue was whether the existence of individual contracts precluded the making
of a collective agreement covering the same issues and thereby justified the
employer in refusing to bargain collectively concerning those terms until the
individual contracts expired. The Court, however, did not limit itself to this
narrow and rather easy issue, but addressed itself broadly to the difficult ques-
tion of the nature of the collective agreement and its relation to the individual
contract of employment.2
In probing these problems, for which the statute made no express provi-
sion, the Court referred to legal theories developed in other countries, and drew
upon Professor Lenhoff's outstanding article, The Present Status of Collective
Contracts in the American Legal System.3 In this article Professor Lenhoff
brought to bear upon American cases and statutory provisions his intimate
knowledge of legal theories developed by Austrian and German scholars.4 He
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
2. The Court decided another case the same day which squarely presented one aspect
of that problem-whether the existence of a collective agreement precluded an employer
from making contracts with some individual employees whereby they agreed to accept wage
rates below those in the collective agreement. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944). The two cases were decided together, and the two
opinions are a single piece. The principal discussion was in the .I. Case Co. opinion, though
citations were borrowed from the Board's brief in that case for use in the other.
3. 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1109 (1941). The Court cited Professor Lenhoff's article only in
Railroad Telegraphers, supra note 2, at 346 n.7, but the same language appears in JI. Case
Co., and other portions of the language and analysis are remarkably parallel to that of
Professor Lenhoff's.
4. Professor Lenhoff explicitly referred to foreign labor law in only one footnote (at
1124 n.50), but his whole structure of analysis and his conclusions bear clear marks of the
theories which he had developed as a teacher and leading scholar of labor law in Austria.
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reshaped those theories to provide an imaginative and coherent analysis of the
legal effects of the collective agreement on the collective parties-union and
employer-and on the individuals subject to its terms. Thus informed by com-
parative law," the Supreme Court wrote an opinion which has become a corner-
stone of American labor law and collective bargaining.
I. INSULAMITY AND UNIQUENESS IN AMERicAN LABOR LAW
1.1. Case Co. v. NLRB is exceptional, for it is one of the few instances in
which either the Court or Congress has looked to foreign experience for possi-
ble solutions to problems in labor law. We have struggled for years with
troublesome problems such as protecting union members from employer hostility,
requiring employers to give their employees a voice in decisions of the enter-
prise, defining the limits of economic force, and prescribing the enforceability
of collective agreements. These same problems confront every industrial society
which relies upon collective bargaining to help regulate the labor market and
to provide a degree of democracy in industrial life. But our legislative records
and judicial opinions are almost wholly barren of any inquiry into the solutions
worked out in other countries. We have borrowed the word "boycott" from the
English Captain Boycott,6 but our law of boycotts bears no resemblance to
English law.7 Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Vegelahn v. Gunt-
ner8 cited English precedents, but the conclusions were even more sharply con-
flicting than these precedents. The Commission- on Industrial Relations of
1916 brought forth proposals 9 which were the forerunner of the Wagner Act,'0
but in doing so made only passing references to foreign experience.' The
legislative history of the Wagner Act emphasized that the rights to organize
and bargain collectively were recognized as fundamental in every democratic
5. The only other law review cited by the Court was Hoeniger, The Individual Bm-
ploymnent Contract Under the Wagner Act: I, 10 Fordham L. Rev. 14 (1941). Professor
Heinrich Hoeniger had been Professor of Law at the University of Freiberg and a leading
scholar in labor law in Germany. See 10 Fordham L. Rev. 64 (1941).
6. See State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 76-77, 8 Atl. 890, 896-97 (1887).
7. Compare Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958), with
Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed v. Veitch, [19421 A.C. 435 (Scot.).
8. 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
9. S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1916). For the basic proposals which are
strikingly parallel to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, see id. at 67-68.
10. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
11. In a subsidiary section of the Report it was recommended that all legal restrictions
on economic action on both sides be removed, with the observation, "This has been most
successfully accomplished by the British Trades Disputes Act, which is the result of 60
years of legal evolution, and in its present form seems to work as successfully as could
possibly be expected." Id. at 81. However, in its basic recommendations fourteen pages
earlier, the Report proposed legislation limiting the employer's economic force by prohibiting
blacklists, yellow dog contracts and discriminatory discharges. Id. at 67-68.
The Report of John R. Commons and Florence J. Harriman, which dissented from the
basic proposals, relied extensively on foreign experience. They urged following the British
model and removing government intervention entirely from collective bargaining. They
rejected any legal restriction on the employer's anti-union economic measures, or any legal
requirement to recognize and bargain with the union, as well as any legal limits on strikes,
boycotts and picketing. Id. at 214-15. See also id. at 177, 187, 189, 200, 203, 209 for reliance
on foreign experience in other areas.
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society,12 but made no inquiry into how those rights were legally protected or
the legal limits within which they were exercised in other democratic countries.18
In 1938, President Roosevelt appointed a commission to study industrial rela-
tions in Great Britain and Sweden. After a summer tour of the two countries,
the commission issued brief reports which sketched some of the main character-
istics of the two systems.14 But these reports quickly gathered dust and had
no visible impact on our labor law, although they had suggestive solutions to
a number of problems confronted by Congress in 1947, such as unionization of
supervisors, industry-wide bargaining and enforcement of collective agreements.
The Taft-Hartley Act' 5 contained only one exception to the prevailing pattern-
the union security provisions of Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) were modeled
after an arbitration decision of Judge Rand of the Supreme Court of Canada;10
but the Landrum-Griffin Act 17 was made from a purely American mold.
The Supreme Court's one significant exception since J.1 Case Co. is
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen,18 in which the Court sought to develop
some workable method of regulating the use of union dues for political pur-
poses. Two years before in International Association of Machinists v. Street,1
the Court-without overtly relying for guidance on any foreign experience 2 0-
held that a union could not, by means of a union shop clause, compel an in-
dividual to pay to the union that portion of his dues used to promote political
causes with which he disagreed. The Court was then confronted with giving
some practical content to this basic policy, and in the Allen case it modeled its
solution on the British method of allowing individuals to "contract out" of
political contributions; the burden was then on the union to show the amount
of dues money so used and to refund that portion periodically to those thus
objecting. The Court suggested that to avoid the practical difficulties created
12. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Committee on Education andLabor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1935) (statement of Senator Wagner in presenting his bill in
committee); Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy 135, 147 (1950).
13. Buried in the 1934 Senate hearings was a substantial study by the International
Labor Office relating to collective bargaining procedures in a number of countries. SeeKuttig, Problems of Conciliation and Arbitration: A Study in Comparative Law, reprintedin Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong.,2d Sess. 312-25 (1934). This study was never discussed in the Hearings, nor is there any
evidence it was read by anyone involved.
14. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Commission on Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Report(1938); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Commission on Industrial Relations in Sweden, Report (1938).
15. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1947).16. See 2 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
at 1422 (1948) (statement by Senator Taft referring to Ford Motor Co. of Canada v. UAW,
1 Lab. Arb. 439 (1946)).17. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 401
(1959).
18. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
19. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).20. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion, referred to the solutions evolvedin Britain, Canada and Australia, and specifically referred to the British legislation regulating
union political expenditures, saying, "Congress is, of course, free to enact legislation alonglines adopted in Great Britain, whereby dissenting members may contract out of any levies
to be used for political purposes." Id. at 817.
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by court decrees the unions could set up separate political funds as in England
and provide orderly procedures for "contracting out,"'21 and in an appendix to
the opinion quoted the relevant sections of the English statute.22
Although 1.1. Case Co. is exceptional in looking at foreign solutions, it is
typical in arriving at a uniquely American solution. In spite of its allusions to
foreign law, the Court's opinion solidified and extended legal rules which have
made American labor law and collective bargaining fundamentally different from
those of any other major industrial country.
Our uniqueness begins with Section 9(a) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act which provides that "Representatives designated . . . by the majority
of the employees in a unit ... shall be the exclusive representatives of all em-
ployees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining .. *23 The need
for this rule was accepted as self-evident, 24 although in most Western European
countries employers bargained simultaneously with competing unions and made
agreements which legally bound only members of each union.2 5 Section 9, read
literally, only prohibited bargaining collectively with other "representatives,"
and did not prohibit bargaining directly with individual employees. Both the
statutory language and Supreme Court dicta, prior to J.1 Case Co., left room
for the individual to make a contract of employment with better or poorer terms
than those in the collective agreement 2 6 -a result which would have followed
the accepted English rule.2 7 The Court, however, in J.I. Case Co. rejected this
result and followed Professor Lenhoff's analysis, built upon the Continental
model, and held that an individual employment contract cannot be effective
to waive any benefit to which the employee is entitled under the collective
agreement. But the Court went beyond this analysis to declare that the indi-
vidual could not bargain even for better terms than those in the collective agree-
ment. "The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining," asserted the
Court, "looks with suspicion on such individual advantages.... [A] dvantages
21. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 123 n.8 (1963).
22. Trade Union Act, 1913, 2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 30; reenacted by Trade Disputes and Trade
Unions Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 52.
23. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
24. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 12, at 81 (statement of Francis Biddle,
Chairman of NLRB); Id. at 243 (statement of Professor Witte); Houde Eng'r Corp., 1
N.L.R.B. (os.) 35 (1934); Bernstein, op. cit. supra note 12, at 136-38.
25. Smith, Cases on Labor Law (Supp. 1954, at 73-79, 153-57). Professor Lenhoff
states that under the French and German law the attempts by unions to reach beyond its
members to all employees in the unit were considered acts of "terrorism." A Century of
American Unionism, 22 B.U.L. Rev. 357, 371 (1942).
26. This argument was spelled out-and rejected-by Professor Lenhoff: The Present
Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1109, 1140-42
(1941).
27. This follows from the basic English rule that the collective agreement is not legally
binding and is only a "treaty" between the union and the employer. As such, it merely
establishes a custom which determines the terms of employment in the absence of some
agreement to the contrary. See Lenhoff, General Report on Content, Legal Effects, Applica-
tion and Execution of Collective Agreements, in Second (Geneva) International Congress of
Labor Law (1957).
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to individuals can be as disruptive to industrial peace as disadvantages."28 This
confident assertion, however, was contradicted by the law and experience of
other democratic countries, where almost without exception collective agree-
ments fixed minimum but not maximum terms and conditions of employment,
and the freedom of the individual to bargain for just such "advantages" was
taken for granted. 29
The statutory rule of exclusive representation, supplemented by the ju-
dicially declared rule that the collective agreement prescribes maximum as well
as minimum terms has far-reaching consequences for our law and institutions
of collective bargaining-consequences too manifold and remote to be traced
here. Obviously, it shapes the legal and working relations between competing
unions, between the employer and the majority union, and between the union
and the individual. Less obviously, it defines the social function of collective
bargaining and the role of the union in regulating the labor market. When the
collective agreement fixes only minimum terms-as it does in European coun-
tries-it serves as a flexible form of minimum wage legislation. Centralized
bargaining through employer associations and extension of the agreement by
government decree to the entire industry emphasizes this social function of
collective bargaining.30 Actual wages and working conditions are largely deter-
mined by bargaining with individuals and groups at the shop level, and in
this bargaining the union often plays little or no role. The collective agree-
ment rates, particularly in periods of full employment, are often twenty to
fifty per cent below the actual rates, with various employers in the same industry
paying quite disparate rates.2 1 The union thus has little control over actual
wages and working conditions. Under Section 9(a) and 1.1. Case Co., the col-
lective agreement serves to regulate the actual terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and in that regulatory process the majority union plays a preemptive
role.
The uniqueness of American labor law does not end with Section 9(a),
for there are other important though less fundamental and marked differences
between our statutory structure and that of most other countries. Two broad
differences reflect our special reliance, at least at the legal level, on collective
bargaining to regulate the labor market. First, the statutory protection given
the process of unionization and collective bargaining by the Wagner Act is
probably without parallel in any other country. Many countries, like France
28. 321 U.S. 332, 338.
29. See generally Labor Law Group Trust, Labor Relations and the Law 333-37
(Mathews ed. 1953). The most noted exception was the Dutch law.
30. See Lenhoff, Some Basic Features of American and European Labor Law: A
Comparison, 26 Notre Dame Law. 389, 417-20 (1951); Kahn-Freund, Labor Law and Social
Security in 2 American Enterprise in the European Common Market 297, 398-400 (Stein ed.
1960).
31. Roberts, Trade Unions in a Free Society 4-5 (1959); Ross, Prosperity and Labor
Relations in Western Europe: France and Italy, 16 Ind. & Lab. Re. Rev. 63, 69 (1963); Ross,
Prosperity and Labor Relations in Europe: The Case of Western Germany, 76 Q.J. Econ.
331, 341-43 (1962).
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and Germany, prohibit dismissal because of union membership, but give little
protection against less gross forms of discrimination and no protection against
many forms of "interference and restraint" proscribed by Section 8(a) (1). 32
Sweden is one of the few other countries which imposes a statutory obligation
to bargain in good faith, but it provides no direct sanction and does not define
the subject matter of bargaining.33 Second, statutory regulation of substantive
terms and conditions of employment is significantly less in the United States
than in many other countries. In most Western European countries such mat-
ters as the length of the work week, the number of paid holidays and the
amount of paid vacation is prescribed by law; and rules requiring notice of
termination and protection against arbitrary dismissal are found in statutes
rather than in collective agreements. 34 Thus, in comparison with other systems,
our labor law places heavy emphasis on protecting the process of collective
bargaining and then relies on that process to regulate the terms and conditions
of employment.3 5
II. SOURCES OF INSULARITY AND UNIQUENESS
Recognition that we have failed to look to foreign experience in con-
structing our labor law and that the system we have built is fundamentally
different from that of other countries raises the difficult question of why this is
so. Why have we struggled for years with seemingly intractable problems which
must be confronted by every democratic industrialized society and have ignored
the solutions proposed and tried in other countries? Why have the solutions
which we have adopted to parallel problems been so different in such funda-
mental respects?
Several reasons for this are immediately apparent-perhaps too apparent.
Each has obvious substance and persuasive appeal, especially when we look
only at the bits and pieces of evidence which confirm it. But closer and more
comprehensive examination can quickly disturb the comfort given by these
easy answers, for, upon such an examination, each reason proves itself to be at
best a partial explanation of the insularity and uniqueness of our labor law.
First, our failure to look at foreign experience is in part a product of our
provincial attitudes. This is more than our narrow self-assurance that others
have nothing worthwhile to teach us about how to solve our problems, though
we have ample of that defect. Our general lack of facility in foreign languages-
itself a product of our provinciality--creates a barrier to our learning about
32. European Coal and Steel Community, La stabilite de l'emploi dans le droit des pays
membres de Ia C.E.CA. 42 (1958).
33. Labor Law Group Trust, op. cit. supra. note 29, at 272-74; Schmidt, The Law of
Labour Relations in Sweden 145-47 (1962).
34. Kahn-Freund, supra note 30, at 363-64; Labor Law Group Trust, op. cit. supra
note 29, at 66-68.
35. This basic difference was emphasized and documented in Lenhoff, Some Basic
Features of American and European Labor Law: A Comparison, 26 Notre Dame Law. 389
(1951).
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labor law in other countries. The language barrier, however, is not now an
adequate excuse for our ignorance-it was scarcely ever an excuse for our re-
fusal to look to English experience.36 Thirteen years ago Professor Lenhoff
contributed to one of the leading labor law casebooks a series of comprehensive
and illuminating comparative comments directly relating foreign labor law to
American rules and problems, 3 7 and shortly thereafter another leading case-
book added a supplement with an equally valuable comparative labor law
discussion.38 The leading Swedish text on labor law, an unusually insightful
and readable work, has been translated and published in this country; 8 a
scholarly colloquium on the law of collective bargaining and industrial conflict
in eight European countries has been published in England; 40 and proceedings
of international congresses have valuable comparative studies on various prob-
lems.41 These are in addition to the growing number of studies by Americans
of foreign labor law and collective bargaining systems. For a student who can
read any one of the four languages of the European Community, there is avail-
able a series of volumes comprehensively describing and comparing labor law
in the six countries. 42
Our provinciality goes beyond our lack of language. We too easily assume
that other systems are enough like our own that we can quickly understand
their similarities and differences. The Commission appointed by President
Roosevelt in 1938 issued reports on two countries as diverse as England and
Sweden after three months of interviews and document gathering. As a result,
the commission failed to focus on the less obvious but more critical character-
istics of the two systems; it emphasized their common feature of acceptance
of collective bargaining while brushing over their contrasts in legal structure and
institutional arrangements; and it gave a superficial, if not inaccurate, analysis
36. With the passage of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, English law began to develop
in the opposite direction from that taken by American law. The English began to move
toward legal abstention in union-employer relations, weapons of economic conflict were
legalized, and the union was freed from liability for tort. See Flanders & Clegg, The System
of Industrial Relations in Great Britain 104-27 (1954). At the same time we moved toward
increasing legal intervention, holding unions subject to the anti-trust laws, restricting picket-
ing and secondary boycotts, holding unions liable in damages, and finally adopting the
massive intervention of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act.
37. Labor Law Group Trust, Labor Relations and the Law (Mathews ed. 1953). Nearly
100 pages of comments were interspersed through the book, giving not only a general picture
of foreign law but also specific foreign solutions to various problems in American law.
38. Smith, Cases on Labor Law (2d ed. 1954). The comment was written by Professor
Kahn-Freund, of the London School of Economics, and formerly a member of the German
Labor Court.
39. Schmidt, The Law of Labour Relations in Sweden (1962).
40. Kahn-Freund, Labor Relations and the Law (1965).
41. See, e.g., Fifth (Lyon) International Congress on Labor Law and Social Security
(1963); Third (Brussels) International Congress on Labor Law (1958).
42. The series is entitled Droit du Travail, and is published by the European Coal and
Steel Community. The studies published thus far are: I, Les sources du droit du travail; IT,
La stabiliti de l'emploi; III, La representation des travailleurs sur ]a plan de l'enterprise;
V, Gr~ve et lockout; IX, La protection des travailleurs en cas de perte de lemploi. An
excellent survey of the labor law of the six countries written particularly for Americans is
Kahn-Freund, supra note 30.
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of the successes and failures of each system and the factors which had contri-
buted to each. The impact of the Commission's reports was commensurate with
their comprehension. Such Cook's tours continue under scholarly and other
auspices, and though they may contribute odd lots to our store of information
and offer grab bags of insights, they can help us little in understanding the
legal rules and institutions which others have used to meet the problems we
must face.
Second, our failure to look at foreign experience is in part a result of our
political process. Our labor law statutes are not the product of rational evolu-
tion but political eruption. Congress does not regularly study specific problems
and make limited revisions, but waits until political pressures have accumulated
and then makes massive changes-at twelve year intervals came the Wagner
Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Landrum-Griffin Act, with no significant
changes in between. Unions and employers can each marshal powerful political
forces to veto any legislative action until cumulative demands for multiple
changes override resistance. When these demands lead to change, Congress, in
the cross-fire of open clash between major social forces, must devise answers
to the whole range of specific problems which have accumulated. There is
neither time nor temper for the careful inquiry and detached reflection neces-
sary to search for solutions in foreign experience. The search is rather for a
political compromise which will placate the maximum number of demands.
In 1947 there was a dominant, though unfocused, demand that agree-
ments be legally enforceable. One side insisted that strikes and lockouts during
the contract term be barred by statute; the other side insisted that the parties
should be free to define their legal obligations by collective bargaining. The
political resolution was to give ambiguous expression to the first demand in Sec-
tion 8(d) and to the second demand in Section 301. 4 The politically explosive
issue of whether an injunction should be available to enforce the contract was
dampened by leaving Section 301 silent and allowing the NLRB to seek in-
junctions for violations of Section 8(d) .4 The unions' long and bitter memory
of the money judgment enforced against individual members in the Danbury
Hatter's Case,45 thirty years before, led to inclusion in Section 301(b) of a
clause freeing union members from such liability.46 Congress' preoccupation
with other problems such as union security, employer free speech, secondary
boycotts, national emergency strikes, and union political contributions permitted
no time to study "peace obligations" and their methods of enforcement in
43. See Note, Labor Arbitration, the NLRB, and Taft-Hartley Sections 8(d): Prob-
lems of Jurisdictional Conflict, 69 Yale L.. 309 (1959).
44. The ambiguity of congressional action is demonstrated in the opposing Court
opinions in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). See also Aaron, The
Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 292, 331-43 (1963).
45. Loewe v. Lawlor, 235 U.S. 522 (1915); see also Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908). For the history of this bitter litigation which lasted 14 years, see Witte, The Govern-
ment in Labor Disputes 131 (1931).
46. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
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other countries. Superficial inquiry at that stage would not have clarified the
problem and would have diverted efforts from the immediate need for patching
together a political compromise and quieting inherited fears.
There is less reason for the courts' failure to examine foreign experience,
for they are able to focus on single problems largely free from political pressures.
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen 47 suggests the special potential of the courts
in fashioning solutions drawn from foreign experience. However, the myth
that the courts only follow the intent of Congress inhibits most judges from
examining solutions worked out in other countries, even when Congress had no
intent or when that intent was not to solve but to avoid the problem. Thus,
the Court in the Lockout Cases4s condemned the NLRB for "unauthorized as-
sumption .. .of major policy decisions properly made by Congress,"' 9 and
then fabricated a Congressional intent to support its own policy decision. The
Court could have gained greater insight into the problem and made a more
responsible decision if it had examined the alternative solutions from other
countries; but that would require an open admission that the Court was mak-
ing the policy decision which Congress had refused to make.
Third, some of our labor law has not developed parallel to that in other
countries because uniqueness tends to beget uniqueness. The basic rule of ex-
clusive representation, as articulated in J.1. Case Co., gave birth nine months
later to the union's duty of fair representation in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. °
More far reaching, the special legal status and protection given unions by the
National Labor Relations Act provided one of the central arguments for
legally requiring unions to observe certain democratic procedures and helped
produce Landrum-Griffin. In the words of the Senate Committee on Labor,
"The Government which gives unions this power has an obligation to insure
that the officials who wield it are responsive to the desires of the men and
women whom they represent." 51 The legal obligations placed on unions by this
statute have no equivalent in any European country, and this further accents
the uniqueness of our labor law.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that there is a necessary one-
to-one relationship between the uniqueness of Section 9(a) and the uniqueness
of these obligations imposed on unions. For example, Belgian law designates
by name the three unions authorized to represent workers in negotiating na-
tional industry agreements through commissions paritaires, and those agreements
may be made binding by royal decree on the whole industry.5 2 But Belgium
has developed no law protecting the rights of union members or insuring demo-
47. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
48. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278 (1965).
49. NLRB v. Brown, supra note 48, at 292.
50. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
51. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Report, S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 20 (1959).
52. Blanpain, La convention collective de travail 37-42, 96-106 (1964).
218
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cratic processes within unions. Neither union members nor the government in
Belgium knows how the sizeable assets of the unions are expended or invested,58
yet there has been no suggestion that the legal status given unions by the
government requires financial reporting or regulation of their internal processes.
Swedish unions in the Confederation of Labor, though lacking such formal
legal status, exercise in fact the power of exclusive representatives and their
agreements effectively regulate terms and conditions of employment for mem-
bers and non-members alike.54 But this power of the unions has not generated
the logic that unions have a correlative responsibility to be democratic. Indeed
the constitution of the confederation prohibits member unions from submitting
proposed contracts to binding ratification vote and requires that the officers
retain full power to make agreements; 55 chairmen of national unions are not
periodically reelected but serve until retirement or removal for cause; 56 and
local unions often encompass such a large geographical area that membership
participation is obstructed. 57 Yet there has been no demand by any party for
legislation requiring union democracy.
The fourth obvious reason our labor law is unique is that the social insti-
tutions which surround it and through which it must function are unique.
Labor law must be shaped to fit the structure of the unions involved, the de-
gree and form of employer organization, the attitudes of unions and employers
to each other, the practices of collective bargaining and a multitude of other
social, economic and political factors. National differences in these factors
lead to national differences in labor law, and awareness of these differences
causes reluctance to rely on others' experience. The validity of this is so obvious
as not to need statement--except as a preliminary to emphasizing limits on
its validity.
The employer unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8 of the Wagner
Act were a legal response to virulent methods commonly used by American
employers to prevent unionization and collective bargaining. French employers
also have a notorious hostility to unions; many engage in anti-union discrimina-
tion, support employer-dominated unions, and refuse to recognize nationally
affiliated unions at the shop level.58 But there is no French equivalent to Sec-
tion 8, and this is the case even though there is an articulate national policy
favoring collective bargaining and relying on it as an important instrument for
53. See, e.g., Confederation des Syndicats Chretiens, Rapport d'activit6: XXI Congress
31-44 (1960). This biennial report shows the amount spent for strike benefits and for various
social benefits, but there is no report, even in gross amounts, of income, expenses, or assets.
54. Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement:
A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 Yale L.J. 421 (1963).
55. Stadgar flr Landsorganisationen i Sverige § 11, para. 2. See Sdlv~n, Landsorganisa-
tionens Nya Stadgar 30-32 (1952).
56. Slvdn, op. cit. supra note 55, at 105.
57. For example, the retail clerks union in 1960 consolidated 260 locals into 40 "greatlocals," for all Sweden. Many of these cover areas with a radius of 30 to 50 miles. [1963]
Handels Nyht. No. 3.
58. Ehrmann, Organized Business in France 9, 37, 42 (1957); Lorwin, The French
Labor Movement 273-76 (1954) ; Sturmthal, Contemporary Collective Bargaining 166 (1957).
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regulating the labor market. The nearest European equivalent to Section 8 is
in Sweden50 where employer acceptance of collective bargaining and the
unionization of industry had, for thirty years, been greater than in any other
country. 0 The rule of exclusive representation would create special, if not in-
soluble, problems where the labor movement is divided along political or re-
ligious lines. This can explain why such a rule has not developed in countries
such as France, Italy, Belgium or Holland; 61 but it can not explain why our
law in this respect differs from that of England and Sweden where the union
movement has not been thus split,62 or from that of Western Germany where
post-war efforts succeeded in building a unified labor movement.03 The Landrum-
Griffin Act was a product of corrupt and undemocratic practices in some Ameri-
can unions. Certain forms of corruption publicized by the McClellan Commit-
tee seem to be uniquely American phenomena-at least they seem to be un-
known in Western Europe. But simple misappropriation of union funds is a
universal problem, though it may be less often discovered or publicly revealed
in other countries. More important, even prior to the passage of Landrum-
Griffin, the vitality of the democratic process within unions, the opportunity of
members to participate in union decisions, and recognition of the right to fair
procedures were probably as great, if not greater, in the United States than
in any other country. Certainly, the great bulk of unions in this country had
far more internal democracy than unions in a number of countries which have
never even discussed the need for such legislation.64
Such differences in social institutions undoubtedly have played a significant
role in giving our labor law its unique character, but these examples are enough
to make us wary of simple answers. Differences are easy to rationalize when
comparisons are limited to two systems, but when comparisons cover several
systems, simple hypotheses are quickly disproven. Explanations may then be
sought in a combination of several differences in social institutions. Though
such hypotheses are probably nearer the truth, they may be more satisfying
only because they appear more sophisticated and more difficult to disprove. As
59. Schmidt, op. cit. supra note 39, at ch. VI.
60. Thirty years earlier the Swedish Employers Confederation, in a "basic" agreement
with the Confederation of Unions, had explicitly recognized the right of employees to join
unions and to bargain collectively. When the statute was adopted in 1956, nearly 90% of all
blue collar workers were organized. The statute was aimed almost exclusively at employers
who were resisting the unionization of their white collar workers. See Summers, Freedom of
Association and Compulsory Unionism in Sweden and the United States, 112 Pa. L. Rev.
647, 653-54 (1964).
61. See Galenson, Trade Union Democracy in Western Europe (1961) for a brief
description of the trade union movements in these countries.
62. Id. at ch. I.
63. Sturmthal, op. cit. supra note 58, at ch. V.
64. See Fifth (Lyon) International Congress on Labor Law and Social Security:
General Report on the Internal Relations Between Unions and Their Members 43-77 (1963)
and the supporting national reports in the same volume. The General Report and three
national reports are reprinted in 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 236-407 (1964).
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the factors to be considered increase, the hypotheses become impossible to test,
for we cannot know enough about the social institutions in other countries to
evaluate their impact. We are left with little more than a bald assertion that
the uniqueness of our labor law is caused by the unique combination of our
institutions. There remains room for healthy doubt that this adequately or
meaningfully explains our uniqueness.
Furthermore, explaining labor law as the product of social institutions
and attitudes oversimplifies the linkage of cause and effect. For example, the
fact that American unions historically were not split along political lines made
the legal rule of exclusive representation feasible in 1935; but the adoption of
the rule is partly responsible for unions not being so split today. The principle
of majority rule grew out of bargaining between a union and a single em-
ployer; but the legal definition of the appropriate unit for determining the ma-
jority has retarded the growth of employer association bargaining. The Court's
dictum in JI. Case Co. that the collective agreement establishes maximum
terms was not compelled by social forces and might be viewed as an historical
accident; but the legal principle has so shaped our institutions and attitudes
as to be nearly indispensable now. Our union and employer organizations, our
collective bargaining structures, and the character of our collective agreements
are different from those of other countries in part at least because our labor
law is different.
All four of the factors discussed above have undoubtedly contributed to
the insularity and uniqueness of our labor law. Combined together they may
provide an adequate explanation of why we have not followed the patterns
evolved in other countries. That, however, is not the important point. What
is important is that none of these reasons, singly or combined, present an in-
superable obstacle to our learning from the experience of other countries how to
better meet the difficult problems with which we are confronted. Our pro-
vinciality is a matter of choice; whenever we want to study seriously the labor
law and collective bargaining systems of other countries, the materials and op-
portunities are available. The ways of Congress are indeed difficult to change
and we can not expect Congressmen to become experts in foreign labor law-
we must be happy if they understand our own. But comparative studies made
by other institutions, public or private, focusing on emerging problems could
give Congress added understanding, fresh ideas, and a wider range of choice
when it must find solutions to multiple problems. And the courts have at least
limited flexibility, particularly in the difficult problem areas, to take guidance
from foreign experience if they are adequately educated by lawyers and scholars.
Finally, the uniqueness of our present labor law and social institutions does not
compel us to perpetuate that uniqueness, at least that special form which we
now possess. We have an area of choice and capacity for change; indeed, we
can within limits design our labor law to reshape our institutions of collective
bargaining.
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III. Tim USEpuLNESS oF FoREIGN EXPEIUENCE
We now come to the most critical question-what, if any, contribution
can the study of labor law in other countries make in working out our own
problems? Assuming that we break out of our provinciality and gain a better
understanding of other systems, will the law and experiences of other countries
be of any practical value in helping us reshape our legal rules?
Only the brashly bold or half blind can urge that simply because another
legal rule or system of rules has worked well in another country, we should
borrow it to solve our problems. Transplanted to another setting, the legal
rules may die or cause disruption. Taft-Hartley has been transplanted to
Japan65 but has not taken root; 66 Norris-LaGuardia was transplanted to the
Philippines but instead of freeing unions from judicial restraint, it provided the
basis for the creation of the labor injunction which had been previously un-
known.67 Hopefully, we would not be so irresponsible to ourselves. Sometimes
we may reasonably believe that the social institutions and attitudes within
which the legal rules function are sufficiently similar to justify borrowing; but
more often the interactions are too complex and subtle to enable us to make
any responsible judgment. The study of labor law in other countries, however,
can be of practical value in a number of less direct ways. Only three need be
mentioned here. The first value in studying comparative labor law is that it
can help free us from the paralysis of unquestioned assumptions. Premises which
are often repeated become self-evident, and that which is customary becomes
accepted as inherent. Studying other systems helps remind us that collective
bargaining can work with quite different premises. The proposition that col-
lective agreements should be binding on employer and union alike, and that
legal remedies should be available, is accepted by many in this country as
being as unquestionable as a Euclidean theorem. But when we learn that in
England the collective agreement is legally binding on neither party; 8 that in
Belgium the employer is bound but there is no legal remedy against the union;6 '
that in Germany the union is bound but it has no effective remedy against the
employer; 70 that in France the employer has no legal remedy against the
worker; 71 and that in Sweden there are legal remedies against the union, the
employer and the individual worker7 2 -when we learn this, we are compelled
to recognize that our self-evident assumptions are self-generated. The fact that
each country considers its result logically compelled by the nature of the col-
65. Labor Union Law, Law No. 174, June 1, 1949 (English translation), 8 Elbun-
Horei-Sha Law Bulletin Series.
66. See generally Levine, Industrial Relations in Post War Japan (1958).
67. See Laurel, The Labor Injunction as an Instrument of Policy in Philippine Labor
Relations, 1960 (unpublished thesis, Yale Law School Library).
68. Kahn-Freund, op. cit. supra note 40, at 25-26.
69. Blanpain, op. cit. supra note 52, at 52-59.
70. Kahn-Freund, op. cit. supra note 40, at 87-88.
71. Despax, Les Conventions Collectives de Travail 275-76 (1966).
72. Schmidt, op. cit. supra note 39, at 47, 213.
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lective agreement underlines for us the freedom we have to choose our premises.
Again, courts, arbitrators and scholars in this country have, at times, been
quick to assert that individuals have no independently enforceable rights under
the collective agreement. 73 The contract is between the union and the employer;
the individual has only those rights created by the union; and the union can
therefore make a binding settlement of his claim. 74 To allow the individual to
sue in his own right would "create a condition of disorder and instability disas-
trous to labor as well as industry."7 5 Such logic loses its compulsion when we
learn that in England and Germany the union has no enforceable rights and
only the individual can sue; 76 that in France the union can sue to enforce in-
dividual claims only if the employee fails to do so; 77 that in Holland and
Switzerland the union can sue, but this does not affect the individual's right
to sue; 78 and that in Sweden the individual can sue if the union refuses to do
so. 70 Indeed, in almost every other country the right of the individual to sue
is considered so self-evident and fundamental that any rule allowing the union
to settle an individual's claim without his consent is unthinkable.
The value in learning that others follow different premises to different
conclusions is not to prove that ours are wrong, but to compel us to confront
the question whether ours are right. New and better solutions to our old and
difficult problems are more likely to be found by a healthy scepticism of what
has been taken for granted than by spinning new logic from worn premises. At
the very least, we are encouraged to think the unthinkable and to consider the
possibility of that which has been assumed impossible.
The second value in examining other labor law systems is that it may give
us fresh insight into the social function of our legal rules. The illegality of
certain forms of economic force is commonly explained in moral terms. The
secondary boycott is illegal because it attacks innocent third parties and is a
conscription of neutrals; the lockout is said to be illegal because it punishes
employees for making demands,80 or said to be legal as a good faith effort to
serve legitimate business interests;81 and the employer's right to hire permanent
replacement is upheld as a right to protect and continue his business.82 But
Sweden has never questioned the legality of the secondary boycott or the lock-
73. See Taschenberger v. Celanese Corp., 34 L.R.R.IV. 2305 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1954);
Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 Stan.
L. Rev. 235 (1961); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956).
74. See, e.g., Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1937); Parker
v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959).
75. Bianculli v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 14 Misc. 2d 297, 299, 115 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718(Sup. Ct. 1952).
76. Kahn-Freund, op. cit. supra note 40, at 25-26, 87-88.
77. Despax, op. cit. supra note 71, at 341-46.
78. Kahn-Freund, op. cit. supra note 40, at 113-14, 121-22.
79. Summers, supra note 54.
80. American Ship Building Co. (Local 374, International Bhd. of Boilermakers), 142
N..R.B. 1362 (1963).
81. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
82. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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out-even the sympathetic lockout-and sympathetic economic action on both
sides is accepted as wholly proper.,3 In France and Italy a lockout would be
considered illegal 4 and the permanent replacement of strikers the violation of
a fundamental right.85 Such differences can scarcely be explained by differences
in moral standards-the reputed warmth of the Latin blood or the popular
image of Swedish morals notwithstanding. We are compelled by the apparent in-
congruity of the differences to seek meaning elsewhere, and in that seeking we
may come to the hypothesis that these legal rules speak to economic strength,
not moral virtue. Balance of economic power between unions and employers
in Sweden requires free use of sympathetic action, particularly by employers
who would otherwise be helpless before strong centralized unions.80 But the
lockout in France and Italy would be devastating to the poorly organized and
financially weak French and Italian unions who must rely largely on recurrent
short term stoppages to wear an employer down.87 Replacement of strikers
would likewise tip the balance against the unions. This hypothesis then requires
us to reexamine our own legal rules to discover whether they have any social
justification other than a crude balancing of economic power. Once we view our
legal rules from this perspective we can make a more meaningful inquiry into
whether they are properly shaped to perform this social function.
Similarly, we may clarify our perspective of organizational picketing, a
phenomenon which is nearly unknown in other countries, and is unknown for
good reason. Other countries provide legal procedures for "extension" of col-
lective agreements-that is, to require all unorganized employers in an industry
to comply with the minimum standards established in the industry agreement
between the dominant employers association and the unions.88 Union standards
in the organized sector are thereby protected from being undercut by competi-
tion based on substandard wages and other conditions in the unorganized sector.80
Organizational picketing in this country, particularly when cast as "area
standards" picketing, 0 seeks to achieve, by marshalling economic pressure, the
same protection of union standards which in other countries is achieved by
government decree. This helps us focus more clearly on the question of whether
we want to protect union wages and other working conditions from competition
83. Schmidt, op. cit. supra note 39, at 162-75.
84. Kanowitz, The Strike and Lockout Under French Labor Law, 9 St. Louis IU.L.J.
211, 234-36 (1964) ; European Coal and Steel Community, Grave et lockout 237-42 (France),
314-20 (Italy) (1961).
85. Kanowitz, supra note 84, at 233; European Coal and Steel Community, op. cit.
supra note 84, at 223 (France), 297 (Italy).
86. 10 Statens Offentlig Utredningar 143, 185 (Swed. 1934). Hallendorf, Svenska
Arbetsgivareforeningen (1927).
87. European Coal and Steel Community, op. cit. supra note 84.
88. Labor Law Group Trust, Labor Relations and the Law 281-87 (Mathews ed.
1953); Kahn-Freund, Labor Law and Social Security in 2 American Enterprise in the
European Common Market 297, 398-400 (Stein ed. 1960).
89. Lenhoff, Some Basic Features of American and European Labor Law: A Com-
parison, 26 Notre Dame Law. 389, 419-20 (1951).
90. See Houston Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council (Claude Everett Constr. Co.), 136
N.L.R.B. 321 (1962).
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with non-union wages and conditions, or whether we want to permit or protect
non-union competition as a check on union economic power. We see the problem
of organizational picketing as more than a problem of balancing the interests
of the employer, the union and the individual; we see it as a problem of defining
and structuring the role of competition in the labor market. We recognize that it
has less to do with union solicitation for membership and free speech than with
the size of appropriate units and the anti-trust laws. This clarification of the
problem does not make the answer easy, nor does it urge adoption of the
foreign solution. But it does help remind us that the solution might take a
totally different form than regulating union patrols and their placards.
The third value of looking to the experience of other countries is that it
may suggest solutions to some specific problems. We are now fumbling with
adapting collective bargaining to public employment, a long-ignored problem
now demanding answers because of the rapid growth of public employee unions
and the increasing acceptance of collective bargaining within government.91
Other countries have had years of experience from which we might profitably
learn, and they have developed legal rules and structures which might be
adapted to our needs.9 2 Flat prohibitions against all strikes by public employees
have been rejected by most other countries as impractical and unresponsive to
the expanding scope of public employment. Instead, distinctions are drawn
between those categories of employees which can strike and those which
cannot. 3 The experience of others can assure us that legal recognition of the
right of some public employees to strike will not undermine the authority of
government. Indeed, it can create greater respect for law than revealing the
government's irresolution and impotence in barring such strikes. Although
other countries have developed no consensus as to just where the line should be
drawn, their rules remind us of the obvious, that there are differences between
strikes of street sweepers, secretaries, school teachers, and policemen. More
important, the very lack of consensus as to the location of the line emphasizes
that an arbitrary line is better than no line at all.
In creating structures for collective bargaining in public employment, we
have unthinkingly sought to build upon the rule of exclusive representation, 4
91. For a discussion of the rapid development and difficult problems in this area, see
generally Industrial Relations Research Association, Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service in Proceedings of the Annual Spring Meeting, 1966; Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Labor
Relations Law, 1963 Proceedings 126-62; id. 1964 Proceedings 355-84; id. 1965 Proceedings
321-43.
92. For discussion of status of public employees, their right to bargain collectively, and
right to strike in various countries, see Sixth (Stockholm) Congress on Labor Law and
Social Security, General Report: Theme HI B (mimeo. 1966), and the supporting national
reports (printed for use at the Congress). See also Labor Law Group Trust, op. cit. supra
note 88, at 108-11. Kahn-Freund in Smith, Cases on Labor Laws 129 (2d ed. 1954).
93. European Coal and Steel Community, op. cit. supra note 84, at 38-40.
94. The President's Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962) provides for three
levels of union recognition in the federal service. "Informal" recognition, which is simply an
extension of the right of any individual or group to be heard by its government, can be
given to any organization which has members in the federal service. "Formal" recognition is
given to any organization which has a membership of at least 10% of the employees in the
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even though the reasons for the rule in private employment have little appli-
cation and the impact of the rule is to curtail the right of individuals or
minority organizations to present their views to relevant governmental officials.
By examining the experience of other countries, we are not only disabused of
the assumption that viable collective bargaining, particularly in public employ-
ment, requires an exclusive representative; but we can also see the wide variety
of structures available ordering multiple representation.
One of our large, though comfortably forgotten, problems is the protection
of unorganized workers. Minimum wage and maximum hours laws provide a
trap-riddled floor which does not even require a high enough wage for a full time
worker to keep above the poverty level. Many workers have payless holidays, no
paid vacations and no sick-leaves. Without a union they have no protector
against abrupt and brutal dismissal, and no orderly procedure through which
they can protest against arbitrary treatment. Though we proceed from the
premise that these protections are to be achieved through collective bargaining,
the harsh fact is that less than one-fourth of the employed work force is covered
by collective agreements. 5 Though we might wish for constantly increased
coverage, the tide is in fact running the other way, with a constantly decreasing
portion of the work force governed by collective agreements.00 Studying the
labor law of other countries, particularly those of Western Europe, shames us
with the realization that others have not thus abandoned the unorganized and
have developed legal rules and structures to protect those outside the reach of
collective agreements. In industries where the majority of employers are
organized, the device of extension is available to make union standards applicable
to the minority of employers who remain unorganized. 7 All employees are
guaranteed by law paid holidays and paid vacations of three or four weeks a
unit, so long as no union has a majority. "Exclusive" recognition is given to the majority
union and it can negotiate on behalf of all the employees in the unit. Am. Bar Ass'n, 1963
Proceedings, supra note 91, at 127-28. In practice, the "exclusive" recognition has had to be
something less than exclusive because of long established competing unions, especially in the
Post Office. Id. at 140.
Several states have adopted statutes providing for collective bargaining by public em-
ployees. All have embraced the exclusive representation rule. The same is true of the New
York City Board of Education, and most other school boards and municipal bodies which
have established collective bargaining machinery. Am. Bar Ass'n, 1963 Proceedings, supra
note 91, at 143-44, 153; 1964 Proceedings, suPra note 91, at 374, 382; 1965 Proceedings,
supra note 91, at 332-36.
95. Statistics on the exact number of workers covered by collective agreements are not
available. However, the exact number is generally estimated to be slightly larger than the
number of union members. In 1964, there were 17,900,000 union members, which is 21.9%
of the total labor force, and 28.9% of the workers in non-agricultural employment. U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Trends and Changes in Union Membership, 89 Monthly Labor Rev. 510
(1966).
96. In 1956, the union membership was 28.8% of the total work force, and 33.4% of
non-agricultural employment. Ibid. The decrease in eight years was thus approximately 4%.
From 1958 to 1962 the coverage of factory workers by collective agreements declined from
67% to 62%, or a decline in the most heavily organized sector of the economy of 5%.
Strasser, Factory Workers Under Bargaining Agreements, 88 Monthly Labor Rev, 164 (1965).
See generally Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement and What Can Be Done About It
(1961).
97. See notes 30 and 88 supra.
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year.98 Substantial notice of lay off or termination is required by law and unjust
discharge is prohibited.99 Statutorily created work councils elected by the em-
ployees at the shop level provide representation and a procedure through which
employees can file grievances, 0 0 and labor courts are open to any individual
employee who claims that any of his rights created by law, by collective agree-
ment, or by individual employment contract have been violated by the em-
ployer.101 With these examples before us we might be moved to at least recon-
sider whether we ought not supplement our truncated collective bargaining
system with similar statutory standards and procedures. Foreign experience
makes plain that collective bargaining need not be the only instrument in a
democratic society for protecting employees and requiring recognition of indi-
vidual dignity in industrial life. It further suggests how legal measures may be
conjoined with free collective bargaining to bring some of the same values to
those employees beyond the reach of collective agreements.
CONCLUSION
Work in comparative law is constantly in danger of becoming little more
than the collecting of legal rules as souvenirs for scholarly display and intellec-
tual one-upmanship. Elaborate and finely drawn comparisons may have little
more meaning and less excuse than the travelling schoolgirl's collection of
foreign dolls in native dress. This danger is greatest when the emphasis is on
comparing legal rules rather than on comparing how the law solves common
social problems. Beyond the rootless question of how the law of another country
compares with ours is the practical question of what we can learn from foreign
experience which will enable us to better understand and deal with our own
problems.
The insignificant role which foreign labor law has played in shaping our
law, our failure to look abroad, and our development of a unique legal and
institutional framework for collective bargaining raises troublesome questions
as to the usefulness of comparative studies in this area of the law. The factors
which have led to our insularity and uniqueness do not foreclose us from learn-
ing from foreign experience. However, these factors do make plain the difficulty
of making meaningful comparisons and the dangers in finding simple explana-
tions of similarities and differences. We are thereby warned against superficial
studies and hasty conclusions drawn from foreign experience. Direct borrowing,
either wholesale or piecemeal, is rarely possible and the fact that a legal rule
worked well elsewhere is no guarantee it will work well here. The value in
98. European Coal and Steel Community, Evenments Sociau dans la Communant,
Note d'information, No. 2 (1963).
99. See generally I.L.O., Dismissal Procedures in Five Countries (1959); Kahn-Freund,
supra note 88, at 428-42; European Coal and Steel Community, La stabilit6 de l'emploi dans
le droit des pays members de la C.E.CA. (1958).
100. Sturmthal, Workers Councils (1964); Kahn-Freund, supra note 88, at 402-17;
Labor Law Group Trust, op. cit. supra note 88, at 72-84.
101. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 88, at 417-22.
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studying solutions developed by other countries, however, is not that they can
provide models which we can imitate, but rather that they can open our minds
to fresh ways of looking at our problems and suggest new kinds of solutions
which we can tailor to meet our special needs. Looking at foreign law may teach
us nothing we could not otherwise know: we begin to question assumptions
which detached reflection would have told us were creatures of habit and not of
reason; we gain a new perspective of particular legal rules and the problems
involved, but the perspective is new only because traditional teachings have
blinded us to the obvious; and the different solutions may be nothing more than
we, with a little ingenuity, should have long ago invented.
In short, studying foreign experience gives us more ideas than answers. It is
a crutch needed only by those of lame imagination and is a reassurance needed
only by those fearful to propose that which they have not seen tried. But it is
just that kind of imagination and willingness to explore new paths which we
seem to need in confronting old and persistent problems in labor law.
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